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CONTINUED CONTROL

16 July 1959

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGEN BULLETIN



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TOP SECRET

### 16 JULY 1959

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### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

suggests possible device Gromyko may propose for getting Western agreement to an aII-German committee.


### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iraqi political groups may see Qasim's remarks on 14 July as signal to start new maneuvering.

Ethiopia planning strong protest to UK over press attacks from British Somaliland.

### III. THE WEST

West Germany soliciting support for French position in UN debate on Algeria, possibly in return for French support on reunification issue.



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ok	political parties s. 6 January 1960, a council" will be council of Communist crit now. The announce political elements izations and mass of key government	announcement that the period hould refrain from activity wind that following this an electer ceated, appears intended to redicism and pressure for open period as an invitation to strengthe following, as well as to try to departments. This may lead or than to the political truce were	Il end before ed "national move the force colitical action d by the various en their organ- control to intensified	25X1	
	protest to the Unit Selassie, apparen	The Ethiopian Government placed Kingdom over press attack tly originating from British S	s on Haile omaliland. This	25X1	
,	may lead to a new	deterioration in Ethiopian-Br the Emperor's acceptance of a	ritish relations,		
) <u>,</u>	ruble credit (\$100	,000,000 at the official rate) fi ddis Ababa to the Soviet credi	rom Moscow.		anga A
- Ite	one of elation beca	ause of the anticipated Soviet Inomic difficulties. However,	help for eas-	9 9	enten
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		III. THE WEST			
	West German for France in the	y - France: Bonn is seeking t UN debate on Algeria this fall	o gain support l. Following up	25X1	
	a personal letter:	from Chancellor Adenauer to hlis, the West German ambass	Greek Prime		
	urged the Greek (	Government to demonstrate NA h position. The Greeks are u	${f ATO}$ unity by ${f sup}$		
· ·	() in view of their po	olicy on Cyprus and their Mid	dle East interests,		
<b>\</b>	fort on behalf of 1	ction is evidence of willingnes France. This may indicate the	at Bonn has shelved		-
	and has begun a n	policy of staying out of colonia ore active role in support of	France, in return		3
25X1	for French diplon reunification.	natic support for the West Ger	man position on ge 5.)		100 1
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	16 July 59	DAILY BRIEF	ii		
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC	
Soviet Spokesmen Hint at Compromise on All-German Committee	
Soviet Spokesmen time at Compromise on Air-German Committee	
Foreign Minister Gromyko may seek to obtain Western agree-	
ment to an all-German committee by offering to make this organ	
subordinate to a four-power commission.	25X1
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such an "autonomous" all-German committee should report to a	
/Your-power senior body" by a certain date. He insisted, how-	
ever, that the USSR would not press for a terminal date on West-	
ern rights in West Berlin.	2574
ern rights in west berint.	25X1 25X1
that a four-power commission to work out the terms of a German	20/(1
peace treaty could be part of a compromise settlement on Berlin.	
Soviet spokesmen are seeking to create the impression that	
the time limit on any interim agreement is harmless by suggest-	
ing that it would apply only to the all-German committee and not	
to the duration of Allied rights in Berlin.	25X1 25X1
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Gromyko, however, made it clear in his public statement of	
28 June that a "definite time limit will be established for the tem-	

Gromyko, however, made it clear in his public statement of 28 June that a "definite time limit will be established for the temporary status of West Berlin and for the work of the all-German committee." He said the temporary status agreement would be "designed for a year and a half," and specified that the "all-German committee would have to complete its work by the end of that period."

The USSR probably would insist that the four-power commission should be confined to negotiating a German peace treaty, with reunification left to the Germans. Moscow rejected a West German

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16 July 59

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 1

25X1	Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600140001-5	
	proposal last September for a four-power commission with advisers from both German states to discuss the "German question," proposing instead that the four powers work toward the conclusion of a treaty and leave the reunification problem to an all-German committee.	
25X1	suggested that the foreign ministers could agree in principle on a time period of two or three years and that the precise date could be established at a summit meeting. He agreed that an all-German committee would imply substantial Western recognition of East Germany, and added that 'it would seem to be one way of making recognition more palat-	
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## The Iraqi Situation

Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim's declaration on 14 July that the "transitional period" of the revolution will draw to an end before 6 January 1960 probably is a move to mitigate the force of Communist criticism and pressure for immediate political activity. Qasim has opposed activity by political parties during this period, despite Communist and extreme leftist demands that political life be restored. Qasim also announced that a "national council" will be elected before the next anniversary of the revolution.

Iraqi political factions are likely to view Qasim's declaration as an invitation to begin strengthening their organizations and mass following, as well as to seek control of government departments that could be used to further their objectives. Although the National Democratic party recently has been stepping up its efforts to gain support outside the cities, the Communists appear to have better organization at the grass-roots level. This may lead to an increase of factionalism and friction rather than the stability and political truce which Qasim probably hoped for.

Qasim's reorganized and expanded cabinet, which appears to reflect a shift toward the left, may be intended to satisfy the Communists in order to balance recent moves favoring the army and nationalists. At least three of the four new members are extreme leftists--Faysal Samir, Guidance; Awni Yusuf, Works and Housing; and Nadia Dulaymi, Municipalities. Dr. Dulaymi, Iraqi's first woman cabinet minister, has a long record of association with Communist-front groups; she is reputedly a member of the Iraqi party's central committee.

In early July all three signed the Communist-sponsored
charter issued by the Communist-dominated "United Front" de-
manding participation of political parties in the government,
arming of the Communist-dominated Popular Resistance Force,
and a purge of "corrupt" elements from the army and govern-
ment.

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# Ethiopian Relations With London May Deteriorate

Addis Ababa will shortly protest to the United Kingdom over press attacks in the British Somaliland Protectorate on Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie and demand that they be stopped, according to the American adviser of the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry. This action may lead to a new deterioration in Ethiopian-British relations, which only recently were reported to be "back to normal." Addis Ababa had reacted sharply to London's policy statement of 9 February on British Somaliland, which Ethiopia claimed was support for a greater Somalia state affiliated with the British Commonwealth at the expense of Somali-inhabited Ethiopian territory.

Addis Abba's proposed protest comes at a time when Ethiopian ties with the West may be subject to new strains over the Emperor's acceptance on 11 July of a \$100,000,000 credit from Moscow. The Emperor reportedly expects 'large numbers of Soviet technicians' to enter Ethiopia in connection with the aid program. This probably accounts for the feeling among some top officials that he has gone too far, although the government officials generally are elated over the prospect that Soviet aid may ease Ethiopia's economic difficulties.

support from Moscow, now may be preparing to assume a more
aggressive attitude toward the West. A remark by the American
adviser that the Ethiopian Government "contemplates strong ac-
tion" unless "full satisfaction" is forthcoming from London may
be an expression of this new policy.

Addis Ababa, perhaps encouraged by what it considers strong

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Page 4

### IIL THE WEST

West Germany Seeks Support for Erench in UN Debate on Algeria

Bonn is attempting to gain support for France during the UN debate on Algeria this fall, possibly in return for continued French support for the West German position on reunification. Following up a personal letter from Chancellor Adenauer to Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis, the West German ambassador in Athens has urged the Greek Government to demonstrate the unity of NATO by taking a firm stand behind France. Bonn's action reflects the high level of personal agreement and mutual support that has gradually developed between Adenauer and French President de Gaulle since the latter's return to power.

Foreign Minister Averoff told US officials that Greece has sought to be as helpful as possible to France in regard to Algeria by not recognizing the Algerian rebel government, but that Greece has traditionally opposed colonialism and has good relations with Arab countries which it is anxious to maintain. He expressed annoyance with the timing of the request, pointing out that it followed too soon after a sizable German loan to Greece.

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